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This study investigates the implications of capital-skill complementarity
for the cyclical behavior of wage inequality. This is done in a dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium model which extends the standard real business cycle model
in three ways. First, the representative agent is replaced by two agent types,
skilled and unskilled. Second, the standard, two-factor Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function is replaced by a more general, four-factor production function
which allows for capital-skill complementarity. Third, the model includes both
neutral and investment-speciﬁc technological change. The model successfully
accounts for both the volatility and the cyclical behavior of the skill premium
in the United States. The results of this study suggest that capital-skill com-
plementarity may be an important determinant of wage inequality over the
business cycle.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Keane and Prasad (1993) found the aggregate skill premium in the United States
to be uncorrelated with contemporaneous unemployment. This study conﬁrms their
ﬁnding and shows that the skill premium also lags the business cycle and exhibits
a volatility which is roughly two-thirds that of output. The purpose of this study
is to test whether or not these three facts regarding the cyclical behavior of the
skill premium can be explained by the presence of capital-skill complementarity in
production.
This is done in a dynamic general equilibrium model which extends the standard
real business cycle model in three ways. First, the representative agent is replaced
by two agent types, skilled and unskilled. Second, the standard, two-factor Cobb-
Douglas production function is replaced by a more general, four-factor production
function which allows for capital-skill complementarity. Third, the model includes
both neutral and investment-speciﬁc technological change. The model is a synthesis
of previous models by Greenwood et al. (1997) and Krusell et al. (2000).
The ﬁndings of this study suggest that capital-skill complementarity may be an
important determinant of wage inequality over the business cycle. The model with
capital-skill complementarity can account for both the volatility and the cyclical
behavior of the skill premium in the United States. The model without capital-skill
complementarity cannot.
In the model with capital-skill complementarity, the skill premium is driven by
both movements in the ratio of unskilled to skilled hours worked and by the ratio of
capital equipment to skilled hours worked. In both the data and the model simula-
tions, the ratio of relative hours worked and the capital-skill ratio are uncorrelated
with contemporaneous output. Together, they produce a skill premium which is un-
correlated with contemporaneous output. Furthermore, the ratio of relative hours
worked leads the business cycle, while the capital-skill ratio lags the business cy-
2cle. The lag in the capital-skill ratio induces a lag in the skill premium, since the
capital-skill complementarity eﬀect dominates the relative supply eﬀect.
The volatility of the skill premium in the model is determined by the volatility
of investment-speciﬁc shocks together with the degree of capital-skill complemen-
tarity in production. Positive investment-speciﬁcs h o c k sa ﬀect the skill premium by
making new capital equipment more productive, which induces individuals to invest
more in capital equipment as opposed to capital structures.1 This increases the
ratio of capital equipment to skilled labor which, in turn, raises the skill premium
through the capital-skill complementarity mechanism.
Investment-speciﬁc shocks are not necessary, however, to match the other two
stylized facts. The model with neutral technological shocks alone also produces
a skill premium which is uncorrelated with contemporaneous output and lags the
business cycle. In fact, these two qualitative results are extremely stable to both
large parameter changes and to diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the production function.
Investment-speciﬁc shocks are important, however, for a sound quantitative analysis.
Until recently, it had been widely accepted that the skill premium in the United
States moved countercyclically. This belief was based mainly on work done by
Reder (1955, 1962) and was introduced into the dynamic macroeconomic literature
by Kydland (1984). Since then, it has been recognized that estimates of the skill
premium using aggregate data may be biased due to the changing composition of
the workforce over the business cycle (Raisian, 1983; Keane and Prasad, 1993; Ziliak
et al., 1999).2 Using microeconomic panel data and controlling for this type of bias,
1Changes in the stock of capital structures do not aﬀect the skill premium in this model, since
the elasticity of substitution between capital structures and both unskilled and skilled labor is
assumed to equal one.
2The aggregate skill premium may suﬀer from a procyclical bias, since employment variability is
greatest among workers at the low end of the productivity distribution. Thus, the average quality
of low skilled workers rises when unemployment is high and falls when unemployment is low,
while the average productivity of high skilled workers remains roughly constant over the business
cycle. This induces a procyclical movement in the relative productivities of these two groups and,
subsequently, in the skill premium as well.
3as well as correcting for potential selection bias, more recent empirical work has
found the skill premium to be uncorrelated with contemporaneous measures of the
business cycle (Keane and Prasad, 1993).3
All of these earlier studies rely upon diﬀerent theories of implicit contracts in
order to explain their empirical ﬁndings. There is never any mention of competitive
wage setting. Keane and Prasad (1993), for example, discuss two types of theoretical
models which can be used to help interpret their empirical ﬁndings concerning the
cyclical behavior of hours and wages of workers with diﬀerent skill levels. The
implicit contract theories of Azariadis (1975, 1976), Bailey (1974), and Gordon
(1974) support the existence of wage smoothing arrangements provided by ﬁrms
for their workers. The implicit contract models of Hashimoto (1981) and Raisian
(1983), on the other hand, imply more procyclical compensation for workers with
higher skills. Both types of models rely on the existence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital
(Becker, 1962) to create incentives to avoid costly separations of skilled workers
from ﬁrms during recessions.
In stark contrast to these studies, this paper presents a simple, competitive
theory of relative wages; one that succeeds in explaining the cyclical behavior of the
skill premium. The success of the model presented in this paper hinges on the use
of a production function characterized by capital-skill complementarity.
The eﬀect of capital-skill complementarity on the relative demand for skilled
labor has been addressed in a number of previous studies (for a review, see Hamer-
mesh, 1993). One of the earliest and most inﬂuential pieces within this literature is
Griliches’s empirical test of the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis (Griliches,
1969).
More recently, The importance of capital-skill complementarity for explaining
3Ziliak et al. (1999) found that the returns to education (in the aggregate economy) for those
with above average education levels were, in fact, weakly procyclical. But, their estimate was not
signiﬁcant and, hence, their study cannot reject the hypothesis that the aggregate skill premium
is uncorrelated with contemporaneous output.
4long run trends in wage inequality has been demonstrated by Krusell et al. (2000)
and Lindquist (2000). Other researchers have illustrated the connection between
capital-skill complementarity and wage dispersion (e.g. Caselli, 1999). This study
makes an original contribution to this new literature by investigating the implica-
tions of capital-skill complementarity for the cyclical behavior of wage inequality.
This study could also be viewed as a complement to the work of Castañeda et al.
(1998) on income inequality over the business cycle.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, the facts regarding
the cyclical behavior of the skill premium are presented. An initial analysis of the
importance of capital-skill complementarity is carried out in Section 3. This is
done in two parts. First, a qualitative example is presented which demonstrates
the potential impact of capital-skill complementarity on the cyclical behavior of the
skill premium. Then, the empirical relevance of this hypothesis is tested. This test
shows that the capital-skill ratio is, in fact, a signiﬁcant determinant of the cyclical
behavior of the skill premium. It motivates the extended analysis which follows.
In Section 4, a dynamic general equilibrium model is constructed which allows
for capital-skill complementarity in production. This model is used to test whether
or not the capital-skill complementarity mechanism can account both qualitatively
and quantitatively for the cyclical behavior of the skill premium together with a
number of standard business cycle facts. It can.
A sensitivity analysis is then carried out which demonstrates that the results
which speak in favor of the model with capital-skill complementarity are robust to
signiﬁcant parameter changes. The sensitivity analysis also investigates how the skill
premium behaves in a model without capital-skill complementarity and it highlights
the role and importance of investment-speciﬁc technological shocks. The sensitivity
analysis concludes with a brief comment on the potential bias which may exist in
the aggregate data on the skill premium used in this study.
5Table 1: The Cyclical Behavior of the Aggregate U.S. Skill Premium
volatilitya cross-correlations of x(t) and skill premium (sp)
skill premiumb 1.90 sp(t-1) sp(t) sp(t+1) sp(t+2) sp(t+3) sp(t+4)
outputb 3.02 -.01 -.20 -.22 -.06 0.09 0.16
unemploymentc 1.51 0.02 0.10 0.05 -.11 -.20 -.21
a) Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of percentual ﬂuctuations around trend.
b) Annual U.S. data, 1963-1992, from Krusell et al. (2000).
c) Annual U.S. data, 1963-1992, from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey.
A ﬁnal test, comparing the impulse response of the U.S. skill premium to output
shocks with the impulse response of the model skill premium to output shocks, is
carried out in Section 5. This test also speaks in favor of the model with capital-skill
complementarity and its ability to explain movements in the skill premium over the
business cycle. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Cyclical Behavior of the Skill Premium
Using output and unemployment as measures of the business cycle, we can begin
examining the cyclical behavior of the skill premium by ﬁrst looking at a set of
simple correlations.4 These are shown in Table 1 along with the volatilities of output,
unemployment and the skill premium. The contemporaneous correlation of output
and the skill premium is −0.20. The skill premium lags output, peaking at t+4with
a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.16. The contemporaneous correlation of unemployment
and the skill premium is 0.10. The skill premium lags this measure of the business
cycle as well, peaking at t +4with a correlation coeﬃcient of -0.21.5
Table 1 is clear on two facts regarding the cyclical behavior of the skill premium;
4The data used in this study (unless otherwise speciﬁed) is taken from Krusell et al. (2000).
Their data set consists of aggregate annual U.S. time series between 1963 and 1992, including;
output, capital structures, capital equipment, the relative price of capital equipment, skilled and
unskilled labor inputs, and the skill premium. They deﬁne skilled workers as those workers with
16 or more years of schooling. Their time series are detrended using an H-P ﬁlter with λ = 100
for use in this study.
Figures on annual unemployment, 1963-1992, are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. This
time series is also detrended using an H-P ﬁlter with λ = 100.
5Similar correlations are obtained using ﬁrst diﬀerences.
6the skill premium lags the business cycle and its volatility is roughly two-thirds that
of output. It is less clear on whether the contemporaneous correlation between the
skill premium and the business cycle is weakly negative or essentially zero.
Alternatively, we can examine the cyclical behavior of the skill premium by
constructing a VAR(p) model of output, yt, the inverse of unemployment, 1/unt,
and the skill premium, ws,t/wu,t. A VAR(1) model without a constant is chosen as
the best representation of the model, since it minimizes both the Akaike information

































εt ∼ N (0,Σ)
where ∆ is a 3 × 3 matrix of OLS regression coeﬃcients and where εt is a 3 × 1
vector of normally distributed i.i.d. shocks with mean zero and variance-covariance
matrix Σ.
The impulse response functions of the skill premium to a one standard deviation
shock to output and to a one standard deviation shock to the inverse of unem-
ployment can be seen in Figure 1. These impulse response functions show us two
important facts about the cyclical behavior of the skill premium. First, they show us
that the skill premium is essentially uncorrelated with both contemporaneous out-
put and the inverse of contemporaneous unemployment, which conﬁrms the ﬁndings
of Keane and Prasad (1993). Second, they shows us that the skill premium lags the
business cycle, which conﬁrms what we saw in Table 1. This paper will attempt to
account for these two facts and for the observed level of volatility in the skill pre-
mium using a dynamic general equilibrium model with a production function which
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Response of skill premium to 1/unemployment
Figure 1: Impulse Response Functions of the Skill Premium to a One S.D. Shock to
Output and to a One S.D. Shock to the Inverse of Unemployment (along with ±2
s.d. bands).
3 An Initial Analysis of the Importance of Capital-
Skill Complementarity
The potential eﬀect of capital-skill complementarity upon the cyclical behavior of
the skill premium can be demonstrated with a simple, qualitative example borrowed
from Krusell et al. (2000). First, assume that capital, kt, and skilled hours worked,
hs,t, are complements, while capital and unskilled hours worked, hu,t, are substitutes.
For ease of exposition, assume also that capital and unskilled hours are perfect
substitutes and that they have an elasticity of substitution with skilled hours equal
to one. Given these assumptions, the production function of a ﬁrm can be written
as




The skill premium can be derived from this function using the ﬁrst order, proﬁt














8Taking the derivatives of the skill premium with respect to relative hours worked















Thus, when production is characterized by capital-skill complementarity, an increase
in the ratio of capital to skilled hours worked raises ceteris paribus the skill premium.
An increase in the ratio of unskilled to skilled hours worked also raises ceteris paribus
the skill premium. In contrast to this, the skill premium associated with a Cobb-
Douglas production function is a function of relative hours only.6
To test the empirical relevance of these theoretical predictions, let us examine
a model of the skill premium with capital-skill complementarity using the Krusell
et al. (2000) data. The model includes output, yt, relative hours worked, hu,t/hs,t,
the capital-skill ratio, kt/hs,t and the skill premium, ws,t/wu,t. The preferred model













































εt ∼ N (0,Σ)
where ∆ is a 4 × 4 vector of OLS regression coeﬃcients and where εt is a 4 × 1
vector of normally distributed i.i.d. shocks with mean zero and variance-covariance
matrix Σ.
Examining the impulse response function of the skill premium to a one stan-
6If the production function is Cobb-Douglas, then fhs,t/fhu,t = ws,t/wu,t = θshu,t/θu,ths,t,
where θs and θu are the income shares of skilled and unskilled labor, respectively.
7This representation of the model is chosen since it minimizes both the Akaike information
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Figure 2: Impulse Response of the Skill Premium to a One S.D. Shock to the
Capital-Skill Ratio (along with ± 2s . d .b a n d s ) .
dard deviation shock to the capital-skill ratio (see Figure 2), we ﬁnd that it has a
signiﬁcant, persistent and positive impact on the skill premium, just as the theory
predicts. We also see that the impact of the capital-skill ratio on the skill premium
is strongest in the second and third periods after the initial shock. These ﬁndings
can be conﬁrmed by running a simple OLS regression on the U.S. data, which results














= 0.41 and DW = 1.56. Once again, we ﬁnd the ratio of capital to
skilled labor plays a signiﬁcant role in determining the cyclical behavior of the skill
premium, albeit with a one period lag.8 The empirical ﬁnding that the (detrended)
capital-skill ratio has a signiﬁcant impact on the (detrended) skill premium speaks
in favor of a model in which production is characterized by capital-skill complemen-
tarity and against the use of a model with a standard, Cobb-Douglas production
function.
8Using output, lagged output, unemployment or lagged unemployment as control variables has
little or no impact on the size or signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient of the capital-skill variable.
104 A nE x t e n d e dA n a l y s i s
In this section, a dynamic general equilibrium model is constructed which allows for
capital-skill complementarity in production. This model will be used to test whether
or not the capital-skill complementarity mechanism can account both qualitatively
and quantitatively for the cyclical behavior of the skill premium together with a
number of standard business cycle facts.
4.1 The Model
Consider an economy inhabited by two types of inﬁnitely lived agents; skilled, s,
and unskilled, u,w h e r eu + s = 1. Agents are born at time zero and acquire their











α<0 < 1,γ≥ 0.
They derive utility from consumption, ci,t, and leisure, li,t,w h e r ei ∈ {u,s} and t
is a time subscript. Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor, so that hours
worked by an agent, hi,t,e q u a l
hi,t =1− li,t. (7)
There is a continuum of ﬁrms in the economy which have identical produc-
tion functions. Firms use capital structures, capital equipment, skilled labor and
unskilled labor to produce output and they behave competitively in product and
factor markets.
Assuming constant returns to scale in production allows us to aggregate across
ﬁrms without loss of generality. Let Ks,t and Ke,t denote the aggregate stock of
11structures and equipment, respectively, and let Hi,t = ihi,t denote aggregate hours



















θ, µ, λ ∈ (0,1); ν, ϕ ∈ (−∞,1); ν, ϕ 6=0
where zt is a random productivity parameter which follows an AR(1) process given
by








where ρz is the persistence parameter and εz are drawn from a bivariate normal
distribution and have mean zero and variance σ2
z (more on this below).
The parameters ν and ϕ are the two key substitution parameters. The income
share of capital structures is given by θ, while µ and λ are the income share pa-
rameters of unskilled and skilled agents, respectively. The elasticity of substitution
between capital equipment and skilled labor is equal to 1/(1 − ϕ).T h e e l a s t i c i t y
of substitution between capital equipment and unskilled labor and the elasticity of
substitution between skilled and unskilled labor are both equal to 1/(1 − ν).I f
ν>ϕ , then the production function is said to exhibit capital-skill complementarity.



















Examining this equation, we see that when ν>ϕ , a rise in the stock of capital
equipment will ceteris paribus raise the skill premium. Krusell et al. (2000) call
9The production function used in this paper is similar to the one estimated in Krusell et al.
(2000).
12this the capital-skill complementarity eﬀect.W ea l s os e et h a tar i s ei nt h er a t i oo f
unskilled to skilled hours worked will ceteris paribus raise the skill premium for any
acceptable values of ν and ϕ. Krusell et al. (2000) call this the relative supply eﬀect.
Equation 10 shows us that the cyclical behavior of the skill premium in the model
with capital-skill complementarity is dependent upon both the cyclical behavior of
the ratio of unskilled to skilled hours worked and upon the cyclical behavior of the
ratio of capital equipment to skilled labor.
The law of motion for aggregate capital structures is
Ks,t+1 =( 1− δs)Ks,t + Xs,t (11)
0 ≤ δs ≤ 1
where Xs,t is aggregate investment in new capital structures and δs is the deprecia-
tion rate of capital structures. The law of motion for aggregate capital equipment
is
Ke,t+1 =( 1− δe)Ke,t + Xe,te
(qt) (12)
0 ≤ δe ≤ 1
where Xe,t is aggregate investment in new capital equipment and δe is the depreci-
ation rate of capital equipment.
The accumulation equation for capital equipment diﬀers from that of capital
structures, since it includes a factor, qt, which represents the current state of tech-
nology for producing equipment. It determines the amount of equipment that can be
purchased for one unit of output. Changes in qt formalize the notion of investment-
speciﬁc technological change, while changes in zt represent neutral technological
change.
The inclusion of investment-speciﬁc technological change in the model is moti-
13vated by the observation that technological change speciﬁct oe q u i p m e n th a sb e e n
far more dramatic over the past three decades than for structures.10 Previous work
has shown it to be an important part of an explanation of rising wage inequality
between skilled and unskilled workers in the U.S. (Krusell et al., 2000). Greenwood
et al. (1997) show that investment-speciﬁc technological can account for 58 percent
of output growth in the United States. In a related paper, Greenwood et al. (2000)
argue that investment-speciﬁc technological change is the source of about 30 percent
of ﬂuctuations in output over the business cycle. In this paper, we shall see that
investment-speciﬁc technological change plays an important role in determining the
cyclical behavior of the skill premium. It aﬀects the skill premium through the
capital-skill complementarity mechanism.
In contrast to Greenwood et al. (1997), shocks to investment-speciﬁc technol-
ogy and shocks to neutral technology will be allowed to covary. The correlation
coeﬃcient between the two types of shocks, ρzq,i sg i v e nb y|σyz/σyσz| ≤ 1. The
stochastic processes governing the movement of qt is modeled as an AR(1) process
qt = ρqqt−1 + εq,t (13)























where ρq is the persistence parameter and εq are drawn from a bivariate normal
10This view is motivated in Greenwood et al. (1997), Greenwood et al. (2000) and in Krusell
et al. (2000) by the following empirical observations. First, that the relative price of structures
appears to be stationary in the U.S. data, as does the ratio of structures to output. Second,
that the relative price of capital equipment has fallen dramatically since 1974, while the ratio of
equipment to output has risen. This view is supported by the empirical work of Gordon (1989,
1990) which describes the rise in productivity in the IT producing sector over the last three decades,
while Pieper (1989) describes a fall in the productivity of the construction sector during this period
(although he argues that this fall may be overexaggerated due to the use of poor statistical methods
in accounting for structures).




+ηεz and variance  2. The unconditional
mean of shocks to investment-speciﬁc technology, µq,i sz e r o .
4.1.1 The Social Planner’s Problem
If we imagine that this economy is governed by a benevolent social planner, the
problem faced by the planner is to choose sequences for consumption, labor supply,
and capital, that, given Ke,0, Ks,0, s,a n du, maximizes the weighted sum of the







t {(1 − Ψ)uUu,t (cu,t,l u,t)+ΨsUs,t (cs,t,l s,t)} (14)
subject to the aggregate resource constraint
Cs,t + Cu,t + Xs,t + Xe,t = Yt (15)
and to Equations 6 - 9 and 11 - 13, where Ci,t = ici,t, β is the discount factor of the
social planner and Ψ is the social planner’s weight on skilled utility.
4.1.2 Model Equilibrium and Solution
An equilibrium for this economy consists of a set of decision rules hi(Ke,K s,z,q) and
ci(Ke,K s,z,q) for i ∈ {u,s},s u c ht h a t(i) the decision rules solve the social planner’s
welfare maximization problem and (ii) prices are equal to marginal products.
The decision rules hi(Ke,K s,z,q) and ci(Ke,K s,z,q) can be found in the follow-
ing manner. First, the Lagrangian function, L, associated with the social planner’s
problem is constructed
L(Ke,t,K s,t,c i,t,h i,t,λ 1,t,λ 2,t,λ 3,t)= (16)
11See appendix A2.8 in Hendry (1995) for the derivation of the marginal distribution of εzt and
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Ke,t+1/e
(qt) − (1 − δe)Ke,t/e
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qt − ρqqt−1 − εq,t
¤ª
where λ1,t, λ2,t and λ3,t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the aggregate
resource constraint, the law of motion for zt a n dt h el a wo fm o t i o nf o rqt, respectively
and where e(zt)F (.) is aggregate production. The agents’ time constraints have been
substituted directly into their utility functions and the laws of motion for aggregate
capital structures and equipment have been substituted into the aggregate resource
constraint.
From this problem we can derive the necessary ﬁrst-order conditions for an opti-
mal solution to the social planner’s problem. For convenience sake, λ1,t is eliminated
from the set of equations. We are then left with a system of eight equations in eight
unknowns which characterizes the equilibrium processes of the model.
The next step is to solve this system for its steady state values. The entire
system of equations can then be log linearized around these steady state values.
The resulting system of linear expectational diﬀerence equations is solved using the
generalized Schur method as described in Klein (2000). The solution to this problem
delivers the decision rules, hi(Ke,K s,z,q) and ci(Ke,K s,z,q).
4.2 Model Calibration
The model is calibrated as follows. First, the proportion of skilled workers in the
economy, s,i ss e te q u a lt o2 4p e r c e n t ,w h i c hi se q u a lt ot h ep e r c e n t a g eo ft h eU . S .
16labor force in 1992 which had 16 or more years of schooling (OECD, 1995). This
deﬁnition of skills is consistent with that used by Krusell et al. (2000).
The key substitution parameters, ν = 0.401 and ϕ = −0.495, and the income
share of capital structures, θ = 0.117, were estimated in Krusell et al. (2000). The
depreciation rate of capital structures, δs = 0.056, and capital equipment, δe =0 . 1 2 4 ,
are taken from Greenwood et al. (1997). Agents are assumed to be risk averse with
γ equal to 2 and the discount rate, β, is set equal to 0.95.
The income share parameters, µ = 0.411 and λ = 0.475, the social planner’s
weight on skilled utility, Ψ = 0.487, and the consumption share in utility, α =
0.576, are calibrated simultaneously. They are calibrated so that in the steady state
agents work (on average) 40 hours a week, skilled workers work 19 percent more
than unskilled workers (Welch, 1997), the skilled wage is 73 percent higher than the
unskilled wage (OECD, 1995), and the income share of capital is 30 percent, which
is the same as that found in the Krusell et al. (2000) data.
The AR(1) process governing investment speciﬁc technological shocks is cali-
brated following Greenwood et al. (2000), with ρq e q u a lt o0 . 6 4a n dσz equal to
0.035. The persistence parameter of the neutral technological process, ρz,i ss e t
equal to 0.815, while σz is scaled so that the volatility of output in the model is
always the same as that found in the Krusell et al. (2000) data. In the benchmark
case, σz is equal to 0.0265.
Examining the detrended12 time series for investment-speciﬁc technological change,
q, and neutral technological change, z,( s e eF i g u r e3 ) ,t h e r ea p p e a r st ob ean e g -
ative correlation between the two time series. This correlation is equal to -0.35.
12T h et i m es e r i e sf o rq and z are estimated and detrended in a manner similar to that used by
Greenwood et al. (2000). Investment-speciﬁc technological change is estimated as follows. First,
let Q equal the inverse of the relative price of capital equipment, which is taken from the Krusell
et al. (2000) data set. Then, estimate lnQt = constant + trend + qt,w h e r eqt = ρqqt−1 + εq,t.
Neutral technologcial change is estimated as follows. First, let Zt = Yt/F (Ke,t,K s,t,H s,t,H u,t),
where Yt, Ke,t, Ks,t, Hs,t and Hu,t are taken from the Krusell et al. (2000) data set. Then,
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Figure 3: Detrended Investment-Speciﬁc Technological Change, q, and Detrended
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Figure 4: Shocks to Investment-Speciﬁc Technological Change, q Residuals, and
Shocks to Neutral Technological Chnage, z Residuals.
More importantly, their residuals (see Figure 4) are also negatively correlated with
a correlation coeﬃcient, ρzq = -0.31.
4.3 Business Cycle Properties of the Model
In this section, the general business cycle behavior of the model is discussed and
evaluated. The main conclusions are that the model performs well along many,
but not all, of the standard business cycle measures and that it performs at least
as well as a standard, homogeneous-agent business cycle model. Furthermore, the
model with capital-skill complementarity matches the data concerning movements
18in the skill premium over the business cycle, while the model without capital-skill
complementarity does not.
Business cycle statistics from the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA), from the Krusell et al. (2000) data set, and from the model are summarized
in Tables 2, 3 and 4. All statistics, for the U.S. data and the model economy, are
calculated on detrended, annual variables. The variables were detrended using an
H-P ﬁlter with λ =1 0 0 . The NIPA data is included as a familiar standard, but does
not include per capita or relative variables concerning skilled and unskilled workers.
Data from Krusell et al. (2000) are used to calculate these statistics.
The business cycle properties of the aggregate real variables in the U.S. economy
are well known. All of them are highly procyclical, except the capital stock which is
uncorrelated with contemporaneous output. Investment is much more volatile than
output and hours worked, which are, in turn, more volatile than consumption and
the capital stock. Productivity leads the business cycle and the capital stock lags
the business cycle. All other real variables peak at the same time as output.
In the model, all aggregate variables are highly procyclical with the exception of
the capital stock which is uncorrelated with contemporaneous output and lags the
business cycle. This lag (which we also observe in the data) will play an important
role for explaining movements of the skill premium over the business cycle in the
model. The model does a particularly good job of matching the volatility and
cyclical behavior of output, capital, investment and hours worked. The volatility of
consumption (relative to that of output), on the other hand, is lower than that in
the data and the measure of productivity is strongly procyclical. Overall, the model
does as well as any standard real business cycle model at matching the cyclical
behavior of the aggregate U.S. economy (see e.g. Cooley and Prescott, 1995).
The dynamic behavior of the aggregate variables in this model can also be il-
lustrated using the impulse response functions generated by the model. If we ﬁrst
19Table 2: Volatilitya of Variables
Variable NIPA datab Krusell et al. datac Model data
1963-1992 1963-1992
output 2.13 3.02 3.02 (0.27)d
consumption 1.85 n.a. 1.87 (0.18)
investment 7.91 n.a. 10.70 (1.22)
hours 2.09 1.11 1.11 (0.12)
productivity 0.93 2.95 2.21 (0.19)
capital 0.67 1.08 1.47 (0.23)
skill premium n.a. 1.90 1.04 (0.15)
equipment/skilled hours n.a. 2.50 4.50 (0.50)
unskilled/skilled hours n.a. 2.15 1.00 (0.09)
skilled wage n.a. 2.07 2.35 (0.20)
unskilled wage n.a. 2.78 2.24 (0.20)
skilled hours n.a. 2.08 1.29 (0.15)
unskilled hours n.a. 1.22 1.16 (0.11)
a) Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of percentual ﬂuctuations around trend.
b) Annual data from the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts.
c) Annual data from Krusell et al. (2000).
d) Standard deviations of the sample distributions (from the simulations) are in parentheses.
Table 3: Correlations of Aggregate Variables with Output
Variable x Cross-Correlations of output (t) with
x(t-1) x(t) x(t+1)
NIPAa Model NIPA Model NIPA Model
1963-1992 1963-1992 1963-1992
output 0.49 0.42 1.00 1.00 0.49 0.42
(0.09)b (0.00) (0.09)
consumption 0.71 0.20 0.90 0.81 0.34 0.48
(0.10) (0.05) (0.09)
investment 0.48 0.48 0.86 0.90 0.15 0.27
(0.09) (0.03) (0.10)
hours 0.24 0.49 0.91 0.81 0.68 0.19
(0.09) (0.04) (0.10)
productivity 0.64 0.33 0.29 0.95 -.43 0.48
(0.09) (0.01) (0.09)
capital -.41 -.31 0.07 0.01 0.80 0.60
(0.08) (0.07) (0.02)
a) Annual data from the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts.
b) Standard deviations of the sample distributions (from the simulations) are in parentheses.
20examine the impulse response of the aggregate variables to a positive shock to neu-
tral technological change (see Figure 5), we see that all of the aggregate variable
have an immediate and positive response, with the exception of the capital stock
which shows a pronounced lag.
Unlike neutral technological shocks, which enter the production function directly,
investment-speciﬁc technological shocks can only aﬀect current output by encour-
aging labor to work more or less in the current period. They do, however, have a
direct impact on the quality of current investments in capital equipment. As we can
see in Figure 6, a positive shock to investment-speciﬁc technology raises investment
and lowers consumption in the current period. Hours worked also increase, which
helps to ﬁnance increased investment and allows for a rise in the marginal product
of capital, despite the fact that capital in the current period is ﬁxed and that the
shock does not enter the production function directly. Thus, both output and hours
respond immediately to investment-speciﬁc shocks, but they do not peak until the
period following the shock.
The total capital stock increases in response to investment-speciﬁcs h o c k s ,a l b e i t
with a strong lag. These shocks also aﬀect the composition of the capital stock. The
amount of capital equipment in the economy is now greater than it was before the
shock (in both absolute terms and relative to structures). It is now more proﬁtable
for agents to invest in capital equipment and less in structures.13 This portfolio
shift aﬀects relative wages in the model since capital equipment and skilled labor
are assumed to be complementary.
Now, let us turn our attention to the business cycle statistics concerning the
per capita and relative variables. In particular, we want to examine the cyclical
properties of the skill premium. But, we also want to look at the behavior of the
13Investments in new structures are still positive. But, they are not large enough to oﬀset depre-
ciation. This is why we observe a negative impulse response of capital structures to investment-
speciﬁc technology shocks. It is not the case that investors are reversing previous investment






























































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Impulse Response of Aggregate Variables to Investment-Speciﬁc Produc-
tivity Shock.
22Table 4: Correlations of Per Capita and Relative Variables with Output
Variable x Cross-Correlations of output (t) with
x(t-1) x(t) x(t+1)
Krusella Model Krusell Model Krusell Model
skill premium -.01 -.07 -.20 0.10 -.22 0.12
(0.13)b (0.12) (0.13)
equipment/skilled -.30 -.13 0.18 0.00 0.19 0.11
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
unskilled/skilled 0.13 0.23 0.05 0.15 -.07 -.07
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
skilled wage -.27 0.29 -.16 0.94 -.11 0.49
(0.09) (0.01) (0.09)
unskilled wage -.32 0.34 -.02 0.94 0.10 0.45
(0.09) (0.02) (0.09)
skilled hours 0.40 0.29 0.12 0.61 0.04 0.20
(0.12) (0.09) (0.13)
unskilled hours 0.77 0.52 0.24 0.82 -.26 0.17
(0.09) (0.03) (0.09)
a) Annual data, 1963-1992, from Krusell et al. (2000).
b) Standard deviations of the sample distributions (from the simulations) are in parentheses.
ratio of equipment to skilled hours worked and of the ratio of relative hours worked,
since it is these two factors which determine the skill premium in the model.
In Table 2, we see that the volatility of the model skill premium is equal to 55
percent of that found in the data. The volatility of the equipment-skill ratio in the
model is 80 percent higher than that found in the data, while the ratio of relative
hours worked is about half that found in the data.
Although not as volatile as in the data, we see in Table 4, that the skill premium
in the model matches the other two stylized facts concerning the cyclical behavior of
the skill premium presented in Section 2. It is essentially uncorrelated with contem-
poraneous output and it lags the business cycle. The skill premium in the model has
ac o r r e l a t i o nc o e ﬃcient with contemporaneous output equal to 0.10 (0.12).14 The
14The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations of the sample distributions from the
simulations.
23correlation in the data is -0.20. The skill premium in the model lags the business
cycle, peaking at time t+2with a correlation coeﬃcient with time t output of 0.17
(0.13) (see Table 5). The skill premium in the U.S. data also lags the business cycle,
peaking at time t +4with a correlation coeﬃcient with time t output of 0.16 (see
Table 5).
Table 4 also shows us that this model does a very good job of tracking the cyclical
behavior of the equipment to skill ratio and of the ratio of relative hours worked.
This is important, since it is these two variables that drive the skill premium in the
model. Both are essentially uncorrelated with contemporaneous output. Together,
they produce a skill premium which is also uncorrelated with contemporaneous
output. In both the data and the model simulations, the ratio of relative hours
leads the cycle, while the capital-skill ratio lags the business cycle. This lag induces
a lag in the skill premium, since the capital-skill complementarity eﬀect dominates
t h er e l a t i v es u p p l ye ﬀect.15
The dynamic behavior of the per capita and relative variables can also be un-
derstood by examining the impulse response functions generated by the model. In
Figure 7, we see that a positive shock to neutral technological change raises the
wages of both skilled and unskilled workers. Higher wages induce both types of
labor to work more hours. The increase in the supply of unskilled hours, however,
is stronger than that of skilled hours, since unskilled workers have a lower marginal
disutility of labor. Thus, the ratio of unskilled to skilled hours worked initially rises
in response to a neutral technology shock.
The ratio of capital equipment to skilled hours worked falls initially, since skilled
hours respond more quickly than the stock of capital equipment to productivity
shocks. Thus, the relative supply eﬀect and the capital-skill complementarity eﬀect
15The model does a rather poor job, however, of tracking the Krusell et al. (2000) data concerning
hours worked by skilled and unskilled workers and their wages (see table 4). The model variables
are too strongly procyclical (a common result in the RBC paradigm). The model does a much
better job, however, at tracking total hours worked as reported in the NIPA data (see Table 2).
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Figure 7: Impulse Response of Per Capita and Relative Variables to Neutral Pro-
ductivity Shock.
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Figure 8: Impulse Response of Per Capita and Relative Variables to Investment-
Speciﬁc Productivity Shock.
25move in opposite directions in response to neutral productivity shocks, resulting in
a skill premium which is essentially uncorrelated with contemporaneous shocks.
In Figure 8, we see that wages and consumption initially fall in response to a
positive shock to investment-speciﬁc technology. Falling wages are due to an increase
in the supply of both types of labor. For unlike neutral technology shocks, which
enter the production function directly, investment-speciﬁc shocks cannot support
wages in the face of an increasing supply of labor. But, despite this drop in wages,
total labor income still goes up. The added income is used together with savings
from lower consumption to invest in new capital-equipment, which is now more
proﬁtable. Once this new capital equipment is in place, the capital-skill ratio jumps
up, as does the skilled wage.
Although the underlying wage dynamics associated with the two diﬀerent types
of shocks are quite dissimilar, their impact on the skill premium is quite similar.
In Figure 8, we see that the ratio of unskilled to skilled hours worked initially rises
in response to the investment-speciﬁc shock, while the capital-skill ratio falls. To-
gether, they produce a skill premium which is uncorrelated with contemporaneous
equipment-speciﬁc shocks. Thus, the skill premium is uncorrelated with contempo-
raneous shocks, regardless of the type of shock.
In both cases, the capital stock begins to grow in the period following the pro-
ductivity shock. This leads to growth in the equipment-skill ratio, which in turn
raises the skill premium. In fact, we can induce from the shape of the two impulse
response functions of the model skill premium, that the capital-skill complementar-
ity eﬀect dominates the relative supply eﬀect, creating a strong, positive lag in the
skill premium in response to productivity shocks, regardless of the type of shock.
In summary, the benchmark model is able to explain 55 percent of the observed
volatility in the skill premium. It produces a skill premium which is uncorrelated
with contemporaneous output and which lags the business cycle. The behavior of
26both the equipment-skill ratio and relative hours worked matches the data quite
well. On the other hand, it fails to explain 45 percent of the volatility in the skill
premium, the point estimate of the contemporaneous correlation of the skill premium
with output in the data lies below the conﬁdence interval generated by the model
simulations and the skill premium in the model peaks earlier than it does in the
data. In the following section we shall see that these problems arise from a rather
conservative benchmark calibration of the model and that they can be remedied by
increasing the degree of capital-skill complementarity in the model.
4.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, a sensitivity analysis is carried out which demonstrates that the re-
sults which speak in favor of the model with capital-skill complementarity are robust
to signiﬁcant parameter changes. It also shows that the model can be calibrated
in such a way as to signiﬁcantly improve its match with the data. The sensitivity
analysis in this section also investigates a number of important questions which are
related to the problem at hand. For example, it will examine how the skill premium
behaves in a model without capital-skill complementarity and it will also highlight
the role and importance of investment-speciﬁc technological shocks. The analysis
concludes with a brief comment on the potential bias which may exist in the data
on the skill premium used in this paper.
Table 5 summarizes the results (with respect to the skill premium) of the diﬀerent
experiments from this analysis. The information from the U.S. data is repeated in
the ﬁrst row of the table and the results from the benchmark calibration are also
included.
The ﬁrst exercise concerns the behavior of the skill premium in a model without
capital-skill complementarity. Here, it is assumed that production is given by a
4-factor, Cobb-Douglas production function. Everything else in the model is left
27Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis
x = Skill premium Volatility Cross-Correlations of output (t) and x
of x x(t) x(t+1) x(t+2) x(t+3) x(t+4)
Data 1.90 -.20 -.22 -.06 0.09 0.16
Benchmark calibration 1.04 0.10 0.12 0.17 0.15 0.11
(0.15) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15)
Model with...
Cobb-Douglas productiona 0.33 0.80 0.21 -.11 -.25 -.26
(0.04) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
ρzq =0 b 1.09 0.25 0.39 0.20 0.08 0.00
(0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)
No investment-speciﬁcs h o c k s c 0.30 0.00 0.75 0.69 0.48 0.26
(0.04) (0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.10) (0.12)
ν =0 .756d 1.90 0.03 0.13 0.19 0.17 0.13
(0.28) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
a) θks = 0.117, θke =0 . 1 8 3 ,θs = 0.276, θu =0 . 4 2 4
b) σz = 0.0243, c) σz = 0.0255, d) µ = 0.3503
unchanged. In this case, the skill premium is a function of the relative hours worked
only.
The volatility of the skill premium in this model is extremely low. It is approx-
imately 17 percent of that found in the data. The skill premium is also strongly
procyclical, which, of course, is not true for the data. In short, the model without
capital-skill complementarity is not able to explain the cyclical behavior of the skill
premium.
Next, the negative correlation between shocks to investment-speciﬁc and neu-
tral technological change is removed. In Table 5, we see that this does not aﬀect
the volatility of the skill premium. It does however increase the magnitude of the
correlations between output and the skill premium, which now peak at time t +1 .
Removing investment-speciﬁc shocks altogether, we ﬁnd that the volatility of
the skill premium drops from 1.04 (0.15) percent to a mere 0.30 (0.04) percent.
Eliminating these shocks lowers the volatility of investment in capital equipment,
which, in turn, aﬀects the volatility of the equipment-skill ratio which falls from 4.50
(0.50) percent to 1.52 (0.50) percent. This, in turn, lowers the volatility of the skill
28premium, since the ratio of capital equipment to skilled hours worked is the main
determinant of the skill premium in the model.
Removing investment-speciﬁcs h o c k sa l s ol o w e r st h ec o n t e m p o r a n e o u sc o r r e l a -
tion between output and the skill premium to 0.00 (0.07). The skill premium peaks
in period t+1with a much stronger correlation than before. The correlation between
time t output and the skill premium at time t +1is 0.75 (0.07).
Thus, even without investment-speciﬁc shocks, the model with capital-skill com-
plementarity produces a skill premium which is uncorrelated with contemporaneous
output and that lags the business cycle. These two qualitative results are, in fact,
very robust to parameter changes and even to alternative speciﬁcations of the pro-
duction function.16 But, as we saw above, investment-speciﬁc technological shocks
are necessary for matching the volatility of the skill premium found in the data, as
well as the magnitude and structure of the lagged correlations between output and
the skill premium.
In general, investment-speciﬁc shocks tend to make the skill premium (weakly)
procyclical. Their impact on output and the skill premium are more immediate than
the eﬀects produced by neutral technology shocks. Neutral shocks tend to make the
skill premium acyclical or even (weakly) countercyclical. So, matching the data
requires a balance between the two.
The elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers and between
unskilled workers and capital, 1/(1 − ν), is obviously central to the analysis in this
p a p e r .T h ee s t i m a t eo fν used in this paper was taken from Krusell et al. (2000) and
was equal to 0.401, which implies an elasticity of substitution of 1.67. This estimate
may, however, be somewhat on the conservative side, at least when compared to the
existing literature.
If we examine the studies summarized in Hamermesh (1993), and restrict our-
16For example, we get the same result if we use a more simple, 3-factor CES production function
which does not distinguish between equipment and structures.
29selves to those which use aggregate or large industry data for the U.S., we ﬁnd
that the average elasticity of substitution between production workers and capital
is equal to 1.96 (the highest reported estimate is equal to 2.92 and the lowest is
equal to 0.91). The average elasticity of substitution between production and non-
production workers is equal to 3 (the highest reported estimate is equal to 5.51 and
the lowest is 0.49).17
Setting ν equal to 0.756, so that the elasticity of substitution between skilled and
unskilled workers and between capital and unskilled workers is now equal to 4.1,18
raises the volatility of the skill premium in the model to 1.90 (0.28) percent. It now
matches the volatility of the skill premium in the data. The volatility of relative
hours worked in the model increases to 1.91 (0.16) percent, making it a closer match
to the 2.15 percent found in the data.
Raising the elasticity of substitution also lowers the contemporaneous correlation
between the skill premium and output to 0.03 (0.13) and increases the value of the
lags. Thus, strengthening the degree of capital-skill complementarity in the model
improves the model’s ﬁt with the data. If we were to, instead, weaken the amount
of capital-skill complementarity in the model, the model would perform more like
the Cobb-Douglas model discussed above. Henceforth, this parameter calibration
(with ν = 0.756) will be referred to as the preferred model.
A ﬁnal observation is that the contemporaneous correlation between output and
the skill premium in the data is (weakly) negative. It is essentially zero in the
preferred model. The correlation in the data falls below the conﬁdence interval of
the model estimate. This is true in all of the exercises above and in the initial,
benchmark model. This result may be due to the presence of a composition and/or
17It is important to note, however, that not all of the elasticities in these studies are directly
comparable to the substitution elasticities in this model. The substitution elasticities in the model
are direct elasticities, while in Hamermesh’s review, there are a good number of Allen partial
elasticities as well.
18This is the direct elasticity between manual and nonmanual workers estimated by Dougherty
(1972).
30selection bias in the Krusell et al. (2000) data set. Controlling for these types
of bias, Keane and Prasad (1993) found the skill premium to be uncorrelated with
contemporaneous unemployment. Their ﬁnding matches the prediction of the model
with capital-skill complementarity.19
5 A Final Test of the Model with Capital-Skill
Complementarity
A ﬁnal test of the model with capital-skill complementarity against the data can be
made using the simulated time series for output and the skill premium generated
by the preferred model in a VAR experiment. First, we construct a VAR(p) model
of output, yt, and the skill premium, ws,t/wu,t, using the Krusell et al. (2000) data.



























 + εt (17)
εt ∼ N (0,Σ)
where ∆1 and ∆2 are a 2 × 2 matrix of OLS regression coeﬃcients and where εt
is a 2 × 1 vector of normally distributed i.i.d. shocks with mean zero and variance-
covariance matrix Σ. The impulse response function of the skill premium (in the
data) to a one standard deviation shock to output (in the data) is shown in Figure
9.
The same experiment is then carried out using simulated output and the simu-
19Changes in the degree of risk aversion, the subjective discount rate and the depreciation rates
of structures and equipment were also examined. They had no signiﬁcant impact on the results
and are, therefore, not reported here.
20This representation of the model is chosen since it minimizes both the Akaike information
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Figure 9: Impulse Response of the Skill Premium (from the data) to a One S.D.
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Figure 10: Impulse Response of the Skill Premium (from the preferred model) to
a One S.D. Shock to the Output (from the preferred model) (along with ± 2s . d .
bands).
lated skill premium from the preferred model. The impulse response function from
this experiment is shown in Figure 10. Examining these two ﬁgures we see that they
resemble each other quite closely. Again, we see that the skill premium is essentially
acyclical and that it lags the business cycle. This ﬁnal test speaks quite strongly
in favor of the model with capital-skill complementarity and its ability to explain
movements in the skill premium over the business cycle.
326C o n c l u s i o n
The purpose of this study has been to investigate the implications of capital-skill
complementarity for the cyclical behavior of wage inequality. The results of this
study suggest that capital-skill complementarity may be an important determinant
of wage inequality over the business cycle. The model with capital-skill comple-
mentarity can account for both the volatility and the cyclical behavior of the skill
premium in the United States. The model without capital-skill complementarity
cannot.
Previous research has shown that the capital-skill complementarity mechanism
illustrated in this paper can also be used successfully to help us understand increas-
ing trends in wage inequality (Krusell et al., 2000; Lindquist, 2000) and increasing
wage dispersion (Caselli, 1999). Together, these and other studies, allow us to con-
clude that capital-skill complementarity is an important ingredient in a successful,
competitive theory of relative wages and that such a theory can, in fact, help us to
understand changes in the structure of relative wages.
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